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Abstract
The theory of equalising differences recognises that wage differentials may be required to
equalise the attractiveness of alternative occupations. We examine this theory using the
Conley/Wooders 'crowding types' model. The crowding types model distinguishes between
the tastes of a player and his crowding type, those attributes of the player that directly effect
the well−being of other players in the same club − a player's skill, productivity or personality
are examples. A club can be interpreted as firm in which the job attributes are the club goods;
thus, the crowding types model, with its distinction between tastes and crowding types,
provides a natural environment in which to study equalising differences. In contrast to results
for earlier models, we demonstrate that even when small groups of players are strictly
effective in a strong sense, an increase in the abundance of players of one crowding type can
increase the core payoffs to players of that crowding type.
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Equalizing diﬀerences and monotonicity of earnings.
In this passage from the Wealth of Nations we ﬁnd the origins of the
theory of equalizing diﬀerences, now suggested to be ‘the fundamental mar-
ket equilibrium construct in labour economics’ (Rosen 1986,1988). The basis
of the theory of equalizing diﬀerences is the recognition that wage diﬀer-
entials may be required to equalize the total monetary and non-monetary
advantages and disadvantages among alternative employments. Thus, get-
ting the most out of the available resources requires matching the appro-
priate type of worker with the appropriate type of ﬁrm: ‘the labor market
must solve a type of marriage problem of slotting workers into their proper
“niche” within and between ﬁrms’ (Rosen 1986). Current theoretical models
of equalising diﬀerences neglect the importance of worker productivity (cf.,
Filer/Hamermesh/Rees 1996).
The Conley/Wooders crowding types model provides a novel way of mod-
elling equalising diﬀerences. This model is a recent development in a lit-
erature originating in the seminal papers of Tiebout (1956) and Buchanan
(1962). The model considers an economy with endogenous club formation
and small eﬀective groups in which players are described by two charac-
t e r i s t i c s-ac r o w d i n gt y p ea n dt a s t et y p e . T h ec r o w d i n gt y p eo fap l a y e r
describes those attributes of the player which directly eﬀect the well-being
of other players in the same club - a player’s skill or productivity are nat-
ural examples. A club is interpreted as a group of players who engage in
some collective activity. Examples include the interpretation of a club as a
local jurisdiction providing public goods. Here we emphasize that a club can
equally be interpreted as a ﬁrm in which the job attributes or by-products
of production are seen as the club goods (cf., Bennett/Wooders 1979). With
this interpretation the crowding types model, with its distinction between
taste and crowding type, provides a natural environment in which to analyze
equalising diﬀerences without neglecting worker productivity.
When small groups of players are strictly eﬀective — that is, when all
gains to collective activities can be realized by groups bounded in size and
1there are many players — it has been shown in a number of contexts that core
payoﬀs exhibit a comparative statics property. Speciﬁcally, an increase in
the abundance of players of one type will not increase core payoﬀst op l a y e r s
of that type. (Kovalenkov/Wooders 2000 provides recent results and refer-
ences.) In this paper we ask whether an increase in the abundance of players
of one crowding type can increase the core payoﬀs to players of that crowding
type. For example, can an increase in the abundance of engineers increase
the payoﬀ to engineers who do not mind a dangerous working environment?
We present an example to show that this may indeed be the case.
The Model
Following Conley/Wooders (1997) consider an economy where players are
described by two uncorrelated characteristics, their taste types and crowding
types. A player has one of T diﬀerent taste types, denoted by t ∈ 1,.....,T ≡
T and one of C diﬀerent crowding types, denoted c ∈ 1,...,C≡ C.
The total population of an economy is described by a vector
N =( N11,...,N ct, ...,N CT), where Nct is the total number of players with
crowding type c and taste type t.Aclub m =( m11,...,m ct,...,m CT) describes
ag r o u po fp l a y e r s , where mct denotes the number of players with crowding
type c and taste type t in the group. When it will not cause any confusion,
we shall refer to a club described by m as ‘the club m’ and similarly for
the economy with population N.T h ecrowding proﬁle of an economy N is
a vector N =( N1,...,NC),listing the numbers of players of each crowding
type in the economy; thus Nc =
!
t Nct. T h es e to fa l lf e a s i b l ec l u b sf o rN is
denoted by N.
Each player belongs to exactly one club. Thus, a partition n of the
population into clubs {n1,...,nK} must satisfy
!
k nk = N. We will write
nk ∈ n when a club nk belongs to the partition n.
It will sometimes be useful to refer to individual players whom we denote
by i ∈ {1,...,I} ≡ I, where I =
!
c,t Nct.W e l e t θ : I → C×T be a
mapping describing the crowding and taste types of individual players. We
will say an player i has type (c,t) if θ(i)=( c,t). With a slight abuse of
notation, if individual i is a member of the club described by m,w es h a l l
write i ∈ m.
An economy has one private good x and club goodsy.A v e c t o r y =
(y1,y 2,...,yA) ∈  A
+ g i v e sc l u bg o o dp r o d u c t i o n . 1 Each player i ∈ I of taste
1As Conley and Wooders (1995), club goods could be just elements in some compact topological space.
2type t is endowed with ωt ∈ R+ of the private good, and has a quasi linear
utility function
ut(x,y,m)=x + ht(y,m)
where i ∈ m and y i st h ec l u bg o o dp r o d u c t i o no ft h ec l u bt ow h i c hi belongs.
The cost in terms of the private good of producing y club goods in club
with membership m is given by a production function f(y,m).Ap a r t i c u l a r
c o m b i n a t i o no fp r e f e r e n c e sa n de n d o w m e n t sf o rp l a y e r si nt h ee c o n o m yN
and production possibilities available to subsets of N is referred to as the
structure of the economy. There are two key assumptions: taste anonymity
in consumption and taste anonymity in production. These capture the idea
that players care only about the crowding types and not the taste types of
the players that are in their club. See Conley/Wooders for formal deﬁnitions.
A feasible state of the economy
(X,Y,n) ≡ ((x1,...,x I),(y1,...y K),(n1,...n K))
consists of a partition n of the population, an allocation of private goods to
players X =( x1,...,x I) and a club goods production plan for each club,






















xi − f(y,m) ≥ 0.
Ac l u bm ∈ N producing a feasible allocation (x,y) can improve upon a
feasible state (X,Y,n) if for all i ∈ m,
ut(xi,y,m) >u t(xi,y k,n k)
where in the original state i ∈ nk and nk ∈ n. A feasible state of the economy
(X,Y,n) is a core state of the economy or simply a core state if it cannot be
improved upon by any club m ∈ N.
An economy satisﬁes strict small group eﬀectiveness, SSGE, if there exists
a positive integer B such that:
3(a). For all core states (X,Y,n) and all nk ∈ n, it holds that |nk| <B .
(b). For all c ∈ C and all t ∈ T it holds that Nct >B .
SSGE is a relatively strong condition; the literature shows, however, economies
satisfying apparently mild conditions, such as boundedness of average pay-
oﬀ, can be approximated by ones satisfying SSGE (cf.,Wooders 1999 for a
discussion and references).
Under SSGE, any core state must have the equal treatment property —
i na n yc o r es t a t e ,a n yt w op l a y e r so ft h es a m et y p em u s tb ee q u a l l yw e l l
oﬀ (cf., Conley/Wooders 1997 or Wooders 1983, Theorem 3 for the general
game-theoretic result). In consequence, for any core state (X,Y,n) there is a
vector of payoﬀs u =( u11,....,uct,....,uCT) ∈ RCT where uct is the utility of an
player with crowding type c and taste type t. A particularly important result
is that for any core state of the economy players with the same crowding types
and possibly diﬀerent tastes must make the same contributions to club good
provision. This feature ensures the optimality of equilibrium with anonymous
prices (that is, admission prices of players to clubs that depend only on
their crowding types) and equivalence of the core and equilibrium outcomes
(Conley/Wooders 1995,1997). This amounts to saying that (monetary) wages
depend only on crowding types and not on taste types.
Monotonicity in Crowding Types





t Gct gives the numbers of players in economies S and G with
crowding type c we now introduce weak monotonicity in crowding types
(WMCT) as follows: Given an economic structure let S and G be two
economies with that structure. The populations of S and G, represented
S =( S11,...,S ct, ...,S CT) and G =( G11,...,G ct, ...,G CT), are allowed to
take any form (that satisﬁes SSGE) for which there exists a core outcome. We
let us =( us
11,....,us
ct,....,us







represent any of these equal treatment core payoﬀs. We say that the payoﬀs
to players of crowding type c and taste type t satisfy:
Weak Monotonicity in Crowding Types (WMCT) if for any populations
such that, for all c   = c and all t , it holds that Sc!t! = Gc!t!,a n d ,f o ra l lt it




ct) · (Sc − Gc) ≤ 0.
Generally, we say payoﬀs satisfy monotonicity in crowding types if a ceteris
paribus increase in the number of players with a given crowding type cannot
4increase the payoﬀ to any players of that crowding type. WMCT restricts
a t t e n t i o nt os c e n a r i o si nw h i c ht h e r ei sac o m m o nc h a n g ei nt h en u m b e ro f
players with each type and the given crowding type. WMCT does not allow,
for example, the number of skilled public good lovers to increase while the
number of skilled public good haters falls. (For our purposes here we restrict
to the situation for which we currently have the broadest positive results. In
further research we consider other sorts of changes in the composition of the
total player set.)
A Counter Example to WMCT
The club good is music. Taste types - players who love to hear music while
they work (L), players who hate music (H) and players who are indiﬀerent to
music (I). Crowding types - workers who sing along with music (S), workers
who do not sing along (N), and workers who occasionally sing (O). Players
form pairs with utilities as below:
UH(S,S)=0 UI(S,S)=10 UL(S,S)=20 UH(O,O)=10U I(O,O)=10U L(O,O)=10
UH(S,O)=5 UI(S,O)=10U L(S,O)=15U H(O,N)=15U I(N,N)=10U L(O,N)=5
UH(S,N)=10U I(S,N)=10U L(S,N)=10U H(N,N)=20 UI(O,N)=10U L(N,N)=0
Figure I: Utilities of combinations of crowding types.
For example, if a worker who does not sing along but likes working in an
environment with music forms a club with a worker who does sing along
then this worker receives 10 units of utility and otherwise, zero units. All
possible combinations of player pairs earn the same revenue from production,
normalized to zero. The resulting worth function is:
5composition total utility composition total utility composition total utility
S L ,S L 4 0 O L ,O L 2 0 N L ,N L 0
S I ,S I 2 0 O I ,O I 2 0 N I ,N I 2 0
SH, SH 0 OH, OH 20 NH, NH 40
SH, SL 20 OH, OL 20 NH, NL 20
SH, SI 10 OH, OI 20 NH, NI 30
S I ,S L 3 0 O I ,O L 2 0 N I ,N L 10
SL, OL 30 NL, OL 10N L , S L 2 0
S I ,O I 2 0 N I ,O I 2 0 N I ,S I 2 0
SH, OH 10 NH, OH 30 NH, SH 20
SH, OL 20 NH, OL 20 NH, SL 20
S L ,O H 2 0 N L ,O H 2 0 N L ,S H 2 0
SH, OI 15 NH, OI 25 NH, SI 20
SI, OH 15N I , O H 2 5N I , S H 2 0
SI, OL 25 NI, OL 15N I , S L 2 0
SL, OI 25 NL, OI 15N L , S I 2 0
Figure II: The worth function
We then consider the two possible core outcomes: (where, for example,
2 × (NH, NH) means two jurisdictions consisting of two individuals, both of
whom do not sing along (N) and hate music (H).)
1. 2 × (NH, NH), 4 × (SI, OL), 2 × (SL, SL), 2 × (OH, NI), 4 × (SH, NL), 2 × (SH, NI) and
1× (OI, OI)
2. 2 × (NH, NH), 2 × (SL, SL), 2 × (SH, OL), 4 × (SI, OL), 4 × (OH, NI), 4 × (SH, NL) and 2
× (OI, OI)
These will give us the following scenarios:
type SH SI SL OH OI OL NH NI NL
#o ft y p ei no u t c o m e 1 644 2 244 44
#o ft y p ei no u t c o m e2 6 4 4 4 4 6 4 4 4
payoﬀ in outcome 11 0 152 015 10 102 0 10 10
payoﬀ in outcome 2 7.5 12.5 20 10 10 12.5 20 15 12.5
Figure III: Core Clubs and Payoﬀsf o rS c e n a r i o s1 and 2.
6Between scenarios 1 and 2 the number of players with type OL, OH and OI
increases by 2 while the number of all other players remains constant. The
payoﬀ to OL players increases by 2.5 in contradiction of WMCT.
Why is it that workers who occasionally sing along with music but like
working in an environment with music are able to gain? We begin by noting
that such workers prefer to work with singers and, in scenario 1,t h o s et h a t
sing along are doing relatively well. This means that OL players have to accept
al o wp a y o ﬀ. I nt u r nw en o t i c et h a tOH types prefer working with workers
who do not sing, but here, it is the players not singing who are accepting
lower payoﬀs. We now move to scenario 2. In this case, the increase in the
number of OH players weakens their position and the workers who do not sing
gain as a result. The ‘knock on’ eﬀect of this is that workers who sing can no
longer demand a high payoﬀ . As the workers who sing lose out the workers
of type OL a r ea b l et og a i n . 2
The intuitive logic: ‘an increase in the number of players with a particular
type will weaken the bargaining position of these players’ does not necessarily
conform with reality. A player can gain more through the knock on eﬀects
of an increase in the number of players with his crowding type but diﬀerent
taste types than he loses from an increase in the number of players with his
crowding type. In the example, OL workers gain more through the increase in
the number of type OH workers than they lose by the increase in the number
of players with their type.
Conclusion
From a general perspective one signiﬁcant area of further study remains:
compensating diﬀerentials on the basis of human capital. A natural way
to analyze this issue is provided by the model of genetic types of Con-
ley/Wooders (1995,19 9 6 )i nw h i c hp l a y e r sa r ee n d o w e dw i t hag e n e t i ct y p e .
Players then purchase their crowding type with costs dependent on their ge-
netic type. For example, a genetic type may be a level of intelligence and
a crowding type an education level with the costs of education negatively
related to intelligence. By endogenising crowding type choice this model
would allow us to study the role education and training play in the theory
of equalizing diﬀerences. Research in progress treats these issues.
2To appreciate what is going on it is useful to draw a grid of 9 dots with taste types against crowding
types and then represent jurisdictions by joining the relevant dots.
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